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
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Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovak party leader Dubcek continued his quest over the weekend for national acquiescence in the Moscow agreement, winning formal party approval for the Soviet-imposed strictures.

In somber addresses to the central committee on 31 August, Dubcek and President Svoboda again indicated that the country's liberalization program will be drastically curtailed. Dubcek pointed out that in the past the party had failed to take into account "the dark and real power of international factors," and that it must not now arouse suspicions that it is avoiding the "obligations" it accepted at the Moscow meeting. He also admitted that the party congress which had met in secret during the first week of the intervention was void, and announced that it would convene again sometime after 9 September.

For the interval, the leaders enlarged the central committee by adding 80 individuals who had been elected to the defunct central committee by the now-void party congress, and expanded the party's presidium from 11 to 21 members. Several of the pro-Soviet conservatives, including Barbirek, Kolder, Rigo and Svestka, have been dropped from the presidium, as was arch-progressive Kriegel. Several other prominent liberal reformers have also been dropped from the central committee. The complexion of both the central committee and its presidium remains progressive, although the tone of the central committee meeting was one of accommodation to rather than defiance of Soviet wishes.

There were unconfirmed press reports yesterday of a meeting of the Soviet party central committee. Communist sources claimed the meeting was called to mitigate the hostile world reaction to the Soviet intervention, and asserted that the Kremlin was considering a conciliatory gesture. The US Embassy notes that Soviet press commentary on Czechoslovakia over the weekend seemed to be taking some of the

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pressure off by giving greater emphasis than before to signs that the situation there is returning to normal. Initial Soviet commentary on the Czechoslovak central committee meeting was straightforward and did not hint at any displeasure over the personnel changes in the central apparatus.

Aside from an apparent bomb explosion in front of the Czechoslovak party's newspaper headquarters on 31 August, the situation in Prague, and throughout the country, was relatively quiet over the weekend. There have been no more demonstrations, and youths are busy painting over anti-Soviet graffiti in an apparent effort to hasten "normalization" and the departure of the occupation forces.

There are continued signs of resistance to some of the more unpopular measures, such as censorship, which have been introduced in recent days. The Journalists' Union announced on 1 September that it will abide by the censorship regulations only for three months. Two newspapers also announced their intention to test the limits of permissible publication. Although there have been several denials of impending mass arrests of liberal intellectuals, many prominent individuals apparently have fled the country, or are not returning to Czechoslovakia from vacations for the time being.


There has been no significant change in the deployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces in Czechoslovakia. Some of the Soviet air units in East Germany that deployed to bases near the Czechoslovak border in southeastern East Germany are returning to their home bases. Six convoys were observed moving north on the autobahns between 31 August and 1 September. All of the convoys included air force equipment such as jet engine starters, mobile control towers, communications vans, and runway sweepers.

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Members of the office of the US Defense Attaché in Moscow returning from a late August trip to Arkhangelsk, Odessa, Tbilisi, and Rostov report no evidence of reserve call-ups in these areas. There was no evidence of the redeployment of military units in these areas to western military districts and what military activity that was seen was described as "normal."

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South Vietnam: The heaviest fighting of the weekend occurred in the Da Nang area.

The enemy shelled the city itself and raided nearby refugee centers and hamlets. Mortar attacks were directed at Marble Mountain airfield and several positions in the countryside. Heavy ground fighting broke out south of the city.

photography indicates that a road west of Da Nang from base areas in Laos has been heavily used lately. Prisoner reports suggest that almost all the local force strength in eastern Quang Nam Province has already been used in the attacks that began on 23 August, indicating that main force units in the area are still available for action.

Communist propaganda has also begun to focus on Da Nang, claiming that their current military activity in this area has generated significant local popular support. Radio Hanoi announced on 31 August the formation of a local chapter of the National Alliance (similar chapters earlier had been set up for Hue and Saigon). No names were mentioned in this new pretense to extensive political power in Da Nang, but the Alliance chapter was reportedly organized by "intellectuals, tradespeople, and religious" leaders of the community for the purpose of overthrowing Saigon representatives and establishing their own "coalition government."

Elsewhere, ground action was light and sporadic as the Communists failed to take advantage of National Day on 2 September to launch a spectacular attack.

There is evidence that the Communists are preparing for another round of heavy fighting in

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III Corps, possibly as a prelude to a large-scale effort against Saigon.

enemy forces plan to launch another series of attacks against government centers in Tay Ninh Province with the aim of aiding troop movements toward the capital.

Some movement toward the capital may have started. Prisoners indicate two battalions have deployed from rear base areas into southern Binh Duong Province, just north of Saigon.

(Map)

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Thailand: The Democratic Party has won its first electoral test of strength with the government.

The Democrats took 22 of 24 seats in the voting for the Bangkok municipal assembly on 1 September. Three recognized government slates managed to elect only one progovernment candidate. The election, the first meaningful one in Thailand in ten years, was orderly and relatively clean, although some cases of government chicanery were reported.

Widely interpreted as an important political barometer, the election results could have a significant impact on key legislative elections scheduled for early next year. The Democrats, the only nationwide opposition party currently active, came out of the election substantially strengthened. Their showing may attract some other antigovernment elements to rally behind their banner.

The election is a major disappointment to those elements within the government who hoped that a Democratic Party defeat in Bangkok, its traditional area of strength, would clear the way for an easy government victory in the legislative elections. The setback in Bangkok comes as a particularly bitter pill, since it represents a repudiation of the municipal leadership which has been associated with Deputy Prime Minister Praphat. One consequence of the election will be to strengthen the hand of Prime Minister Thanom in the factional wrangling with Praphat.

The election results indicate that the government will have to put aside its squabbling and marshal its considerable resources to guarantee a clear-cut victory in next year's legislative elections.

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Japan: Komeito, political arm of the Buddhist lay organization Soka Gakkai, plans to form several front organizations in an effort to accelerate the party's growth.

Komeito--Clean Government Party--became a significant factor in national politics last year. In its first venture into elections for the powerful lower house, the party won 25 of 32 seats contested to become the third strongest opposition party. In elections last July, Komeito demonstrated that it could command popular support outside its membership when it became the second-ranking opposition party in the upper house.

Soka Gakkai President Daisaku Ikeda subsequently announced the formation of new front groups aimed at a broad cross section of Japanese society including women, youth, and intellectuals. Ikeda also stated that Komeito is going ahead with plans announced last November to organize a labor affiliate.

These organizational moves reflect the leader-ship's assessment that Komeito's long-term goal of becoming the leading opposition party depends on the attraction of a much broader following than the membership of the parent religious organization. The new bodies offer alternatives to Communist and Socialist labor and front groups for those Japanese who might be willing to support Komeito but not Soka Gakkai, which many Japanese consider a fanatical fringe element.

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USSR: Preliminary estimates for the next five-year $\overline{\text{plan}}$ (1971-75) call for a continuation of the slowdown in the growth rate of electric power production.

Soviet planners attribute this slowdown to a reduced rate of growth in consumer demand for electric power.

The annual increase planned for 1971 through 1975 is about 9.6 percent, approximately the same as the revised annual rate in the current five-year plan (1966-70). An annual increase averaging 11.6 percent was attained from 1961 to 1965.

Soviet officials cited changing patterns of consumption as the reasons for the decline: growth in the planned production of consumer goods, which requires relatively less electric power than the production of heavy industrial goods; technological innovations in all branches of industry; transfer of enterprises to the new system of economic reform which encourages greater economies of materials and resources; and the change-over to a five-day work week. In addition, transportation and the rural economy require considerably smaller increases in electric power than in the past.

Uruguay: The Communist Party is planning a general strike between 4 and 6 September.

The party wants to disrupt both private business and governmental operations but hopes to avoid antagonizing the government to the point that President Pacheco would outlaw it. The Communists do not fully control the situation, however, and youthful extremists in their own ranks and from competing radical organizations may attempt to provoke violence.

Party officials may view the strike as a means of increasing their prestige as leaders of a militant organization after a relative lull in antigovernment activity. Fear of government retaliation, however, plus workers' concern over pay losses and other sanctions will work to curtail enthusiastic participation, and many of the Communists' elaborate plans for a prolonged and total work stoppage may not be carried out.

Venezuela: Extremists are planning to step up their efforts to interfere with the presidential and congressional elections to be held in December.

The Castroite Movement of the Revolutionary Left reportedly plans a campaign ranging from persuasion to violence against government officials and American business interests. Top priority will be given to kidnappings, assaults, sabotage, and the promotion of disruptive strikes.

Individuals identified with this group and with the Communist dissidents led by Douglas Bravo have already staged a number of attacks against electoral registration headquarters. On 27 August Bravo's guerrillas attacked two town halls in Falcon State, killing one police officer and kidnapping another. Another group attacked a voter registration center in Caracas and exploded a propaganda-filled grenade.

The level of violence in the last six months is higher than during the same period in 1967, but it is still low compared with that prior to the 1963 elections.

Since then, the government's counterinsurgency forces have been strengthened, and the Communist insurgent movement has split into competing groups. In addition, the leadership of the Communist Party for the time being has committed itself to participation in the elections through its electoral front, the Union for Advancement.

NOTES

Rumania: The situation is now more relaxed than it was last week, when a flurry of unconfirmed reports of troop buildups along Rumania's frontiers suggested a possible Soviet intervention. Military activity in northeast Bulgaria, according to the US Defense Attaché, consists of an army-level communications exercise, and as of 30 August, no combat units had been observed in the area. Western military attachés in Hungary have not been able to find any evidence of troop concentrations near the Rumanian border. Soviet diplomats in several Western capitals over the weekend denied that Moscow has any intention of invading Rumania. The Rumanians, with their most recent circumspect commentary on Czechoslovakia, seem to be trying to avoid provoking the Soviets.

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Congo (Brazzaville): The power struggle under way in Brazzaville since mid-July has been brought to a boiling point again by the army's bloody suppression 30-31 August of armed leftist youth elements. Opportunistic army chief Ngouabi appears at this time to retain the strongman role he gained early last month at the expense of President Massamba-Debat. The President is reportedly in army custody, but he has not been formally removed.

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Guatemala: Security forces continue on alert but there has been no progress in the search for Ambassador Mein's killers. Press reports claim that one of the vehicles believed to be involved in the assassination had been found abandoned last Friday. The assassins have not been apprehended despite widespread arrests.

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Mexico: President Diaz Ordaz delivered his state of the union address to the legislature on Sunday without incident. The threatened student disorders did not materialize. Diaz Ordaz announced minor concessions to the students but emphasized his intention to maintain peace and order.

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